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REPLY
LEGITIMACY AND OBEDIENCE
David A. Strauss*
Perhaps we should just stop talking about legitimacy altogether.
Why do we even need to use the word, at least in discussions of constitutional law? That is one of the questions raised by Richard Fallon's
thoughtful and exceptionally illuminating article.' Why not just talk
about moral right and wrong, or about legal right and wrong, or about
whether a particular law or legal system is generally accepted by a
population? Using the term "legitimacy" only adds the potential for
confusion; why not dispense with it?
The answer is that discussions of "legitimacy" do add one element
to debates over constitutional issues. To condemn something as illegitimate - a statute, a Supreme Court decision, a President's claim to
have won an election, or something else - is, I think, implicitly to
threaten defiance. It is to suggest that the government should, in some
respect, not be obeyed. There are mistaken decisions, lawless decisions, morally wrong decisions. Those are all familiar forms of criticism. Calling a decision "illegitimate" adds the suggestion that the decision is mistaken, or lawless, or immoral, in a way or to a degree that
raises a question about whether it should be obeyed. For me, this is
one of the principal lessons of Professor Fallon's article.
Disobedience and defiance, in this respect, are matters of degree in
the same way that, as Professor Fallon notes, the acceptance of government authority is a matter of degree.' To say that a President was
not legitimately elected is not necessarily to assert the right to disregard a bill that that President has signed into law or a lawful military
order that the President has issued as Commander-in-Chief. Rather,
the claim of illegitimacy asserts that in some respect the President
should not be accorded the deference he would otherwise receive: his
proposed appointees will be scrutinized more closely; his legislative initiatives will encounter more hostility; he will not be viewed as having
a mandate to carry out an extensive program of policy initiatives. The
same is true for the assertion that a Supreme Court decision is illegiti* Harry N. Wyatt Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School. I am grateful to
Richard Fallon for his gracious comments on an earlier draft and to the Sonnenschein Fund at the
University of Chicago Law School for financial support.
1 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, i 18 HARv. L. REv. 1787 (2005).
See id. at pp. 18o5-o6; see also id. at p. 1831 ("Clearly the authoritative legitimacy of judi-

2

cial decisions can be relative, rather than absolute. Regional variations also can occur.").

1854
HeinOnline -- 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1854 2004-2005

2005]

LEGITIMACY AND OBEDIENCE

1855

mate. It does not necessarily amount to an assertion that the parties to
the case can ignore the Court's ruling. But it does mean that such a
decision - unlike, for example, a decision that is simply legally wrong,
even clearly legally wrong - should have less weight as a precedent in
court and should have a diminished role in shaping the judgments that
other branches of government make about the lawfulness of their
actions. 3
Professor Fallon's account is descriptive rather than prescriptive;
he is concerned with how the term "legitimacy" is actually used, rather
than with how the term should be used. 4 For that reason, his article,
as I understand it, does not take a position on whether the term "legitimacy" is best confined to the uses I have suggested. But his precise
and accurate typology helps demonstrate why the term should be used
only in more limited ways. Often, in the instances Professor Fallon describes, the use of the term obscures the claim that is being made. In
addition, it is not clear why the same term should be used for three
different kinds of claims. And Professor Fallon points out that the
various uses of "legitimacy" share a "concern[] with the necessary, sufficient, or morally justifiable conditions for the exercise of governmental authority."s My suggestion is that this last insight can be the basis
for a specific, prescriptive definition: the term "illegitimacy" should be
reserved for that subset of wrong actions to which defiance, of some
form, is a proper response.
I. THREE KINDS OF LEGITIMACY?
Professor Fallon identifies three basic kinds of legitimacy: moral,
legal, and sociological. To oversimplify his careful account, a government action - a Supreme Court decision, for example - is morally
illegitimate if it is morally wrong; more precisely, a claim that a decision is morally illegitimate is a claim that it is outside the bounds of
reasonable moral disagreement. 6 Similarly, a decision is legally illegitimate if it is clearly wrong as a matter of law.7 Sociological legitimacy, in contrast with the other two forms, is a descriptive and not a
normative notion: a government action enjoys sociological legitimacy if
it is generally accepted by the population as morally binding in some
way.8 Acceptance in this sense is different from merely yielding to the
threat of force, although, as Professor Fallon explains, it is difficult to

3 See id. at pp. 1831-32.
4 See id. at pp. 1790-91.
5 Id. at p. 1791 .
6 See id. at p. 1834.
7 See id. at pp. 1817-I8.
8 See id. atp. 1795.
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specify precisely what kind of acceptance is needed to confer sociological legitimacy. 9
Professor Fallon is surely right that the term "legitimacy" is sometimes used in the ways he describes. But particularly in the case of
"moral" and "legal" legitimacy, the claim of illegitimacy, in Professor
Fallon's typology, seems to be just another way of saying something
for which we already have an adequate vocabulary. Why speak of legitimacy at all, instead of just saying that an act was clearly morally
wrong or clearly legally wrong?
Beyond that, as Professor Fallon notes, none of these three notions
of legitimacy seems quite right in isolation. None seems to capture
what people are trying to say when they denounce something, such as
a Supreme Court decision, as illegitimate. 10 Consider, first, moral legitimacy. Not all morally wrong government actions are illegitimate.
A tax cut that gives money to the wealthy and deprives poorer people
of public services might be plainly unjust - that is, morally wrong,
perhaps egregiously morally wrong. But critics who are willing to denounce such a policy as morally wrong would not automatically, or
even usually, add that it was illegitimate. Similarly, it would be odd to
say that all judicial decisions that are clearly legally wrong are illegitimate. A court might make a plainly erroneous decision on a matter
of, say, bankruptcy law or civil procedure, but we would not ordinarily
call *such a decision illegitimate.
As Professor Fallon's discussion
shows, the claim of illegitimacy seems to be reserved for decisions like
13
2
Roe v. Wade, 11 Bush v. Gore,1 or Miranda v. Arizona.
Sociological legitimacy, in Professor Fallon's sense, certainly does
seem to capture some important uses of the term "legitimacy." Someone might say, for example, that a certain regime is entitled to diplomatic recognition because it is the legitimate government of a foreign
country. That is the descriptive, sociological use of the term "legitimate"; a regime can be legitimate in this sense even though it governs
in ways that are not morally justified - by not allowing free elections,
for example. We do not seem to have another simple way to express
this notion of legitimacy, and Professor Fallon's analysis of "sociological" legitimacy is right on target. But this is not how the term "legitimacy" is most commonly used in discussions of constitutional law. In
most of the examples Professor Fallon discusses, "legitimacy" (or, more
commonly, "illegitimacy") is used normatively, as a term of praise or
condemnation, rather than descriptively. At least for purposes of con9 See id. at pp. 1795-96.
10 See id. atp. '79'.
11 410U.S. 113 (1973).
12 531 U.S. 98 (2000).

13 384 U.S. 436 (i966).
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stitutional debates, then, none of the three senses of legitimacy that
Professor Fallon identifies seems to reflect the most common uses of
the term. And to the extent they do, we do not need the term, and we
could alleviate confusion by speaking directly of clear moral or legal
wrongness.
II. THE COMPLEX RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
LEGAL AND MORAL LEGITIMACY

Why do people continue to use the word, then? What are people
claiming when they unreflectively assert the illegitimacy of, say, a judicial decision? Professor Fallon's typology might be read to suggest
that they are saying either that the decision is morally illegitimate or
that it is legally illegitimate, and that we can gain analytical clarity by
specifying which of those claims is being made. But I am not sure that
is right. A claim that a court decision is illegitimate often seems to be
simultaneously, and inseparably, both a legal and a moral claim.
Moreover, it is not simply a claim of clear legal error; nor is it simply a
claim of clear moral error. Rather, it is a particular kind of moral
claim, one that is often (though not always) related to a claim of legal
error. To be more precise: a claim that a decision is illegitimate is a
claim that the decision is, as a moral matter, not entitled to a full
measure of obedience; and legal wrongness may be, but need not be,
part of the reason for reaching that conclusion.
Professor Fallon's examples help illustrate this point. He notes that
Korematsu v. United States' 4 might properly be regarded as "constitutionally illegitimate,"' 5 which, in Professor Fallon's terms, is a form of
legal illegitimacy. 16 Korematsu upheld the exclusion order that forced
Japanese Americans from their homes on the West Coast of the United
States during World War II. Korematsu certainly might have been, as
Professor Fallon suggests, clearly wrong as a legal matter, but the critics of Korematsu are saying more than that. An important part of
their objection is that the decision upheld an action - the exclusion of
the Japanese Americans - that was a serious moral wrong.
Bush v. Gore has also been widely attacked as illegitimate. 7 Part
of the basis of the attack is again that the decision was clearly wrong
as a legal matter. 8 Beyond that, many critics say that the Court did
14 323 U.S. 214 (I944).
15
16

Fallon, supra note I, at p. 1848.
See id. at pp. 1848-49 (linking "[legal" and "constitutional" legitimacy).

17 See generally BUSH v GORE: THE QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY (Bruce Ackerman

ed.,

2002).
Is See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Off Balance, in BUSH V GORE: THE QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY, supra note 17, at 192, 196 ("[T]he Court gave no legally valid reason for this act of usurpation.").
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not simply make a mistake but in some sense acted in bad faith. That
claim of bad faith also seems to be part of what underlies the assertion
that the decision is not just wrong but illegitimate.' 9 But the criticism
of Bush v. Gore is different from the criticism of Korematsu. It is no
part of the Bush v. Gore critics' case to say that the result brought
about by the Supreme Court's decision - George W. Bush's becoming
President - was itself morally wrong in the way that the Japanese
American exclusion was morally wrong. 20 Unlike in Korematsu, the
objection is not to the outcome but solely to the fact that it was the
Supreme Court that brought about that outcome.
Sometimes claims that a judicial decision is illegitimate resemble
the attacks on Korematsu; sometimes they resemble the attacks on
Bush v. Gore. The critics who say that Miranda v. Arizona is an illegitimate decision do not always say, and need not say, that the police
practices mandated by that decision are bad practices in any sense.
Their claim is just that the Supreme Court should not have been the
institution that required those practices. Some critics of Roe v. Wade
do assert, as critics of Korematsu do, that the decision, by allowing
abortions, brings about morally bad results. But not all critics of Roe
v. Wade say this. Some of the most severe critics of Roe v. Wade believe that, as a moral matter, women have the right to have an abortion; their criticism is that the legislature, not the courts, should secure
that right. 2 ' To give a more extreme example, it would surely be illegitimate for the Supreme Court to order the President to invade a foreign country - even if the invasion was morally justified and the
President's refusal to order the invasion was morally wrong.
Does this mean, in Professor Fallon's typology, that the critics of
Korematsu are asserting that that decision is both morally and legally
illegitimate, while the critics of Bush v. Gore are asserting only legal
illegitimacy? That does not seem right. The critics of Bush v. Gore
are not just asserting that the Court is clearly legally wrong. They are
also making a moral claim. As Professor Fallon explains, judges, like
other officials, have a moral obligation to conform to their proper institutional roles. When they overstep the boundaries established by those

19 See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Can the Rule of Law Survive Bush v. Gore?, in BUSH V
GORE: THE QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY, supra note 17, at 11o, 114 ("[F]ive Republican mem-

bers of the Court decided the case in a way that is recognizably nothing more than a naked expression of these justices' preference for the Republican Party.").
20 See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, In Partial but Not Partisan Praise of Principle, in BUSH V.
GORE: THE QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY, supra note I7, at 67, 8i ("[T]his was an election between two relatively ordinary and not especially interesting, let alone frightening, politicians.").
21 See, e.g., John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE
L.J. 920, 923-26 (973).
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roles, they do something that is morally wrong, at least in certain cir22
cumstances.
The implication of this point is that what Professor Fallon would
call claims of legal illegitimacy are not always distinct from claims of
moral illegitimacy. Rather, a claim that a decision is clearly legally
wrong can be a component of a certain kind of moral argument - an
argument that the decision is not entitled to a full measure of obedience. Moreover, as I noted earlier, people do not condemn decisions as
illegitimate just because they are legally wrong, even clearly legally
wrong. If the Supreme Court simply made a mistake on a relatively
technical legal subject, no one would call its decision illegitimate; that
would be rhetorical overkill, even if the mistake were clear.
The assertion that a decision is illegitimate also does not amount
simply to an assertion that the decision produces a morally wrong outcome. There are many such decisions that would not be condemned as
illegitimate. A person who thinks that capital punishment is immoral
will not necessarily, or even ordinarily, say that a decision upholding a
death sentence is illegitimate, given the current state of American law.
Similarly, someone might think a criminal sentence, authorized by law,
was so severe as to be clearly morally wrong, but again one would not
ordinarily condemn a decision as illegitimate because it upheld such a
sentence.
Finally, a claim of illegitimacy does not always depend on an assertion that a decision is legally wrong. Another of Professor Fallon's
23
well-chosen examples - the fugitive slave laws - makes this point.
It would have been possible (indeed, I think it would have been correct) to have asserted that a decision returning a fugitive slave was illegitimate - and should have been evaded, undermined, or even flatly
defied - even if the decision was legally correct. The crucial element
of each of these claims of illegitimacy is the assertion that it is morally
proper to withhold full obedience. The reason may be the clear illegality of the action (as in Bush v. Gore, according to some critics of that
decision); a combination of the illegality of the action and the immorality of the outcome (as in Korematsu); or simply the extreme immorality
of an admittedly legal outcome (as in the fugitive slave example).
A claim that a judicial decision is illegitimate is, therefore, neither
simply a claim that it is legally wrong nor a claim that it produces
morally wrong results. Neither legal wrongness nor moral wrongness
(in the sense that the decision produces morally objectionable results)
is a sufficient condition of claiming illegitimacy. Nor is either of those
a necessary condition (although generally, it seems, one of them will be

22 Fallon, supra note i, at pp. 1834-39.
23 Id. at p. i8oi.
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present). A claim of illegitimacy is a specific kind of moral claim
about obedience, sometimes but not always based on a claim of
illegality.
III. THE NATURE OF ILLEGITIMACY
My suggestion is that when people say that a judicial decision is illegitimate, they are saying that it should not receive the deference to
which it would otherwise be entitled. In an extreme case, an assertion
that a decision is illegitimate might amount to saying that the decision
should simply be ignored. But the claim of illegitimacy need not go so
far; there are less extreme ways of denying a decision its usual force.
If a decision is illegitimate, for example, the Court should have no
hesitation in overruling it. Similarly, if a decision is illegitimate, lower
courts should feel free to read it very narrowly, and the other branches
of government may do likewise. More generally, a claim of illegitimacy may be a way of asserting that the Court is properly subject to
more far-reaching attacks, such as legislation that deliberately challenges the Court's rulings or other measures that seek to undermine
the Court's power. Those kinds of actions are not proper responses to
a decision that is simply mistaken; they are the steps one takes in re24
sponse to an illegitimate decision.
The most extreme case of an illegitimate decision is a corrupt decision, that is, one in which the judges ignored their duty and simply
advanced their personal interests. In such a case, one might say, they
have not acted as judges at all. If the judges are not acting like
judges, arguably their decision need not be treated as the decision of a
court. This is why the assertion of bad faith in Bush v. Gore seems so
closely connected to the claim of illegitimacy. If the Justices stepped
outside their assigned role - and asserted, for example, a legally
untethered power to bring order to the electoral process (or, in a more
extreme version that I do not endorse, if they simply became partisan
actors) - then there is a good argument that they acted morally
wrongly in a way that forfeited their claim to obedience. This is one
way that a claim of illegitimacy might differ from a claim of simple,

24 I leave aside here the "departmentalist" view of constitutional interpretation, examined with
great insight in LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES (2004). According to that
view, the other branches of the federal government are free to advance their own interpretations
of the Constitution and need not defer to the Supreme Court's. See id. at lO6-07. If a departmentalist view is correct, then legislation that deliberately challenges the Court's rulings on a constitutional question need not be seen as an attack on the Court's legitimacy; the rough analogy
might be to a court of appeals that differs with the decisions of another court of appeals. The
point of a claim of illegitimacy is that a decision is entitled to less deference than it would ordinarily receive; the departmentalist position is that the courts are - ordinarily - entitled to less deference than people today commonly think.
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even if clear, error. More generally, a claim of illegitimacy asserts that
the Justices have, to a degree - through some combination of legal
and moral error - forfeited their right to rule.
Other governmental actions, such as legislation or an executive decision, might also be illegitimate. In each case the nature of the claim
is the same: this government action is not entitled to a full measure of
obedience. People who believe that a law is illegitimate might evade it
by technically complying while seeking to defeat its purpose; they
might litigate over its enforcement in instances in which litigation
would ordinarily be unwarranted; they might disobey and accept punishment; or they might disobey and try to avoid punishment. Similarly, people who think a President's election was not legitimate might
deny the President the full range of deference a President would normally get, without engaging in outright defiance. In each of these instances, the characteristic feature of a claim of illegitimacy is the assertion that, as a moral matter, full obedience is not required.
This account of illegitimacy may also explain why the term "legitimacy" is used for both normative and descriptive claims. The assertion that a government action is illegitimate, in the sense I am proposing, is unmistakably normative. But it also suggests that the government action does not deserve sociological legitimacy - it does not
deserve to be accepted. That is, perhaps, why we use the same term in
both contexts.
To summarize: my proposal is that the term "legitimacy" is not best
understood as a tripartite notion. Rather, in constitutional debates, an
assertion of legitimacy is generally used, and should only be used, to
make a certain kind of moral claim: that a government action is not
entitled to a full measure of obedience. Ordinarily, when the action is
a judicial decision, the claim of illegitimacy will be based on an assertion that the decision is seriously flawed as a legal matter. But such an
assertion is not a necessary component of a claim of illegitimacy. And
even when the claim of illegitimacy is based on a legal premise in that
respect, it is a moral claim, and a moral claim of a specific kind, one
having to do with obedience.

IV. THE LEGITIMACY OF THE CONSTITUTION
Much of Professor Fallon's article is devoted to questions concerning the legitimacy of the United States Constitution. In the most important respects, his account seems to me entirely correct. In particular, he is surely right in saying, A la H.L.A. Hart, that the Constitution
owes its legitimacy to the fact of general popular acceptance (of some,
hard-to-specify kind) rather than to its adoption by a form of popular
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vote hundreds of years ago.2 5 But in two respects, the account of legitimacy I suggest may lead to somewhat different answers to the
questions that Professor Fallon poses about the Constitution's
legitimacy.
First, Professor Fallon suggests that the Constitution should be re26
garded as only "minimally legitimate" rather than ideally legitimate.
His point is that the Constitution is not morally ideal; it contains some
provisions that are unjust and does not address some fundamental
27
matters that, arguably, a morally ideal constitution would resolve.
Of course, it is a very difficult question how much a morally ideal constitution should resolve and how much it should leave to the ordinary
legislative process; a constitution can fall short of the moral ideal in either direction. But one can certainly accept Professor Fallon's premise
that the Constitution does not achieve the moral ideal in some significant respects.
The Constitution is nonetheless minimally legitimate, Professor
Fallon says, because it is reasonably just and it is widely accepted. I
agree with Professor Fallon that, ordinarily, it is a sufficient condition
of legitimacy that a legal regime is reasonably just and widely accepted. This use of the term "legitimacy" is the one I suggest: it means
that the regime is entitled to obedience. In any event, Professor Fallon
seems clearly right when he says that a regime need not be perfectly
just in order to deserve obedience.
I would not draw a distinction, however, between minimal and
ideal legitimacy, at least not for the reason Professor Fallon does. He
draws this distinction in order to make the point that certain aspects of
our constitutional regime are morally defective. But that point can be
made, and usually should be made, without invoking the notion of legitimacy. The provision in the Constitution that disqualifies naturalized citizens from becoming President 28 seems to me clearly morally
wrong. But it would be odd to say that that morally wrong provision
draws the Constitution's legitimacy into question; it is better seen as
simply a moral shortcoming in the Constitution. The same is true of
the argument that there are some matters that our Constitution leaves
to the legislature but that an ideal constitution would resolve: that
point is probably better made in just those terms, rather than by saying that it lessens the legitimacy of the Constitution. If the important

25 See Fallon, supra note i, at pp. 1804-o6.
26 Id. at p. 1813.
27 See id. at p. 1807; id. at p. 18og (citing Frank I. Michelman, Ida's Way: Constructing the
Respect-Worthy Governmental System, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 345, 362 (2003)) ("[Sjome reasonable parties might decline to consent to a constitutional compact that gave no definitive assurance
concerning how matters of moral urgency would be resolved .....
28 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
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issues left unresolved by the Constitution are handled in a satisfactory
way by the legislature, then there does not seem to be any reason to
question the legitimacy of the Constitution. We would simply say that,
in an ideal regime, those matters would not have been left to the legislature at all.
Legitimacy can be a matter of degree, as Professor Fallon is right to
emphasize. But the degree to which a regime enjoys legitimacy depends on both its moral soundness and the extent to which the regime
is accepted; so it seems not quite right to say (as I take Professor
Fallon to be saying) that a constitution falls from being ideally legitimate to being minimally legitimate just because of moral deficiencies.
Even if the Articles of Confederation were not seriously morally defective, their legitimacy declined over time and was finally extinguished
when the Constitution was accepted. On the other hand, as Professor
Fallon says elsewhere in his article, a regime with serious moral weaknesses might enjoy a high degree of legitimacy if there is no other
game in town, that is, if the only alternative to that regime is anarchy.
In such a situation, even a regime with significant moral failings might
still merit obedience - that is, it might still be legitimate.
Judged in that way, the United States Constitution is fully, not
minimally, legitimate, even though it is not a moral ideal. There is no
question, for most of us, that the Constitution is sufficiently just, and
sufficiently widely accepted, so that its claim to obedience - its legitimacy - is beyond question. It would be possible, in principle, for
there to be a regime that was morally superior to the Constitution but
less fully legitimate because it did not enjoy as high a degree of acceptance as the Constitution. For these reasons, I would not say that the
Constitution's moral shortcomings make it less than fully legitimate.
My second (and again relatively minor) disagreement with Professor Fallon concerns his proposal that we can pass judgment on the legitimacy of the Constitution, taken in isolation from the rest of the system of laws that governs the United States. The reason to do this, he
says, is that we want to be able to make moral criticisms of particular
parts of the law. 9 A constitutional regime with a Fugitive Slave
Clause 30 could be legitimate, if the regime as a whole were widely accepted and, despite that Clause, not intolerably unjust (if, for example,
the Clause was seldom invoked). But, Professor Fallon suggests very plausibly - we would still want to denounce that Clause as illegitimate, and if we are limited to holistic judgments about the legitimacy of an entire system, we cannot do that.
29 See Fallon, supra note i, at pp. 18il-12; id. at p. 181

(stating that one should "[r]esist[] the

conclusion that the moral legitimacy of parts of the law can never be appraised independently of
the whole").
30 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3.
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I agree with Professor Fallon that we should make judgments
about the legitimacy of particular components of our legal system; we
should not be in the position of having to make an all-or-nothing
judgment of the entire system. Nonetheless, I have two concerns. The
first is, again, that it is better not to conflate claims about legitimacy
with claims about morality. The Fugitive Slave Clause was surely
immoral. Was it also illegitimate? That is a different question; it is
the question whether that clause should be obeyed. I would give the
same answer to both questions: the Fugitive Slave Clause was not entitled to a full measure of obedience, to say the least. Many inhabitants
of free states held that view; they systematically sought to undercut enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Clause and in some instances defied it
outright. But still, the question of legitimacy is different from the
question of moral wrongness, and it would be possible to say that the
Clause was morally wrong but not illegitimate - as many other people, including judges, did at the time. They believed that, although the
requirement that fugitive slaves be returned was immoral, it should be
obeyed. The disqualification of naturalized citizens from the Presidency makes the same point - morality and legitimacy are different
things - in a less important context.
My second concern is that Professor Fallon seems to suggest that
one can evaluate, in isolation, the legitimacy of the Constitution, by
which he appears to mean the document with its amendments. 3 1 As I
said, I agree with Professor Fallon that we can evaluate the legitimacy
of components of the legal system and need not make an all-or-nothing
judgment. But I do not think that the document called the Constitution, with its amendments, is the kind of component that can be evaluated. There is a complex network of understandings that guides the
interpretation of the document, and those understandings determine
what the document actually requires and permits. 32 The legitimacy of
the document cannot be evaluated without taking those understandings into account.
31 See Fallon, supra note I, at p. 1812 ("[I]t should suffice to say that the Constitution is the
document and set of amendments thereto that are broadly accepted as the written expression of
the foundational commitments of the United States as a political community and that therefore
structure debate about how those commitments ought to be understood, both inside and outside
the courts.").
32 Of course, the document itself, taken totally in isolation, does nothing. The only reason it
has any legal force is that it is widely accepted as legally binding. And its words cannot be given
any meaning at all unless some background understandings are accepted - such as understandings that it is obligatory and not hortatory, and that words are to be given their normal meaning
(or some version of it) and not taken ironically. Professor Fallon of course understands these
points; in fact, he makes them as well as anyone. See, e.g., id. at pp. 18o9-i. The question is
whether the document, interpreted according to such widely shared and uncontroversial understandings, can be said to be legitimate or not.
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For example, some provisions of the Constitution, such as the Takings Clause or the Due Process Clauses, might be interpreted to forbid
many regulatory and redistributive laws 33 - occupational safety laws,
for example, or progressive taxation. If those Clauses were so interpreted, many people would regard the Constitution as more questionable morally; some might even doubt its legitimacy. But the document
itself does not preclude such interpretations. Only a complex set of legal arguments, resting on precedent and other sources of law not found
in the text itself, precludes such interpretations and saves the document from questionable legitimacy.
Consequently, it does not seem to make sense to talk about the legitimacy of the document alone. It does not seem right to question the
legitimacy of the document just because it is possible to interpret some
of its provisions in ways that would undermine its legitimacy. Probably no constitution could ever be drafted in a way that would, as a linguistic matter, preclude every interpretation that might render it immoral or illegitimate. On the other hand, it does not seem right to
affirm the legitimacy of the document, taken in isolation, without
knowing how its provisions are interpreted. The only solution is to
recognize that the legitimacy of the document (or any provision of it)
must be assessed in connection with understandings about how it is to
be interpreted - understandings not found in the document itself.
Similarly, even if the document itself permits certain practices that
are morally wrong and illegitimate, that should not count against the
legitimacy or morality of the Constitution if, given our political culture, those practices are virtually certain not to occur. For example,
the text of the Constitution quite clearly permits the President to be
elected through undemocratic means. Article II provides that the
President is to be chosen by electors who are appointed "in such Manner as the Legislature [of each State] may direct, ''34 and nothing in the
Constitution says that that "Manner" must be, in any sense, democratic. Does this count against the legitimacy of the Constitution?
Surely the answer depends at least in part on the likelihood that some
state would actually do such a thing. That likelihood cannot be discovered from the document. For these reasons, while it makes sense to
consider the legitimacy of particular provisions of the Constitution in
isolation from the entire system of laws, those provisions must be considered in context - a context of precedents and general understandings that determine what effects the provisions will have.

33 See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53-65 (1905). See generally RICHARD A.
EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985).

34 U.S. CONST. art. II, § I, c1. 2.
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V. CONCLUSION

Professor Fallon is right in saying that the term "legitimacy" is
widely used in discussions about constitutional law, and he is also right
in his tactful suggestions that the term is often used haphazardly, with
no clear sense of what is meant. Professor Fallon's terrific article goes
a long way toward providing a clear sense of the term, and discussions
of legitimacy and the Constitution would be immeasurably improved if
those involved paid close attention to his analysis. For me, though, the
crucial aspect of Professor Fallon's account is the connection he suggests between legitimacy and obedience. To question the legitimacy of
something - a constitution, a statute, a legal regime - is to question
whether it is entitled to obedience. That is the central contribution of
the notion of legitimacy.
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